# Pull Request Template
## Description
* sidekiq-cron upgraded to 2.4.0
* Sidekiq constrained to stay on 7.3.x
* Devise advisory ignored in .bundler-audit.yml with the reason:
Chatwoot does not enable Timeoutable, so the timeout redirect path is
not reachable
### Details
The sidekiq-cron upgrade is from 1.12.0 to 2.4.0.
What changed that matters for us:
Fixes the reported Sidekiq Web UI reflected XSS in 2.4.0.
Adds namespace handling changes from the 2.x series. Chatwoot does not
use custom cron namespaces in config/schedule.yml, so the migration
guide says no action is needed for our usage.
Drops support for old Sidekiq/Redis versions. We are still on Sidekiq
7.3.1, which is supported.
Adds new dependencies: cronex and unicode.
Keeps the same APIs we use: Sidekiq::Cron::Job.load_from_hash!(schedule,
source: 'schedule'), Sidekiq::Cron::Job.destroy(name), and require
'sidekiq/cron/web' still exist.
Chance of breakage: low, based on the current Chatwoot usage.
The main thing I would watch after deploy is scheduled job registration
in Sidekiq. The one subtle area is namespace behavior: if production has
custom, manually-created cron jobs using non-default namespaces,
load_from_hash! cleanup behavior could matter. For the committed
config/schedule.yml jobs, which do not specify namespaces, they should
continue in the default namespace.
For concerns around Devise, it does not look exploitable in current
Chatwoot, because Chatwoot does not enable Devise :timeoutable.
I checked:
app/models/user.rb (line 59) lists the Devise modules, and :timeoutable
is not included.
config/initializers/devise.rb (line 164) has the timeoutable section,
but config.timeout_in is commented out.
SuperAdmin inherits from User, so it does not add a separate timeoutable
path either.
So from a practical security perspective: the vulnerable redirect path
requires warden_message == :timeout, which is only produced by Devise
Timeoutable. Since Chatwoot does not use Timeoutable, this warning is
not currently reachable.
Is the patch really needed? Strictly for current exploitability: no.
Fixes #CW-7141
## Type of change
Please delete options that are not relevant.
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality not to work as expected)
- [ ] This change requires a documentation update
## How Has This Been Tested?
Spec and lints and change-log checks with codex.
## Checklist:
- [x] My code follows the style guidelines of this project
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [ ] I have commented on my code, particularly in hard-to-understand
areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream
modules
Co-authored-by: Vishnu Narayanan <iamwishnu@gmail.com>
Hardens Active Storage handling on Rails 7.1 by filtering internal
direct-upload metadata keys and limiting proxy range requests, while
keeping audio playback on redirect URLs so large recordings are not
routed through the proxy limiter.
Closes
- CVE-2026-33173
- CVE-2026-33174
- CVE-2026-33658
Why
Rails 7.1 does not currently have patched releases for these Active
Storage advisories, and Chatwoot exposes Active Storage direct-upload
endpoints and media URLs. This keeps the Rails dependency unchanged
while adding small local mitigations until Rails can be upgraded to
7.2.3.1+.
What changed
- Filters `identified`, `analyzed`, and `composed` from direct-upload
blob metadata.
- Limits Active Storage proxy range requests to one range under 100 MB.
- Uses redirect URLs for inline audio attachments so normal playback of
large recordings avoids the proxy streaming path.
- Adds scoped bundle-audit ignores for the locally mitigated Active
Storage advisories and the remaining Rails advisories that are not
reachable through current Chatwoot usage.
How to test
- Upload an attachment from the dashboard reply composer and confirm it
sends successfully.
- Upload an attachment from the website widget and confirm it appears in
the conversation.
- POST a direct-upload request with `blob.metadata.identified`,
`blob.metadata.analyzed`, and `blob.metadata.composed`; confirm those
keys are not persisted while custom metadata remains.
- Play an audio/call-recording attachment and confirm the audio URL
loads through Active Storage redirect rather than proxy.
- Run `bundle exec bundle audit check -v`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Muhsin Keloth <muhsinkeramam@gmail.com>
This ignores `CVE-2026-33658` in `bundler-audit` after validating that
Chatwoot's default and recommended storage setups do not use Active
Storage proxy mode.
Fixes: N/A
Closes: N/A
## Why
`CVE-2026-33658` is an Active Storage proxy-mode DoS issue triggered by
multi-range requests.
For Chatwoot, the default and recommended setups do not appear to route
file downloads through Rails proxy mode:
- `config/environments/production.rb` selects the Active Storage service
but does not opt into `rails_storage_proxy`
- `.env.example` defaults to `ACTIVE_STORAGE_SERVICE=local`
- Chatwoot's storage docs recommend local/cloud storage with optional
direct uploads to the storage provider
- existing specs expect redirect/disk-style Active Storage URLs rather
than proxy-mode URLs
Given that validation, ignoring this advisory is a smaller and more
accurate response than a framework-wide Rails upgrade.
## What this change does
- adds `.bundler-audit.yml`
- preserves the existing advisory ignore entries already used by
Chatwoot
- ignores `CVE-2026-33658`
- documents why the ignore is acceptable for Chatwoot's current defaults
- notes that this should be revisited if Chatwoot enables
`rails_storage_proxy` or other app-served Active Storage proxy routes
## Validation
- reviewed `config/environments/production.rb`
- reviewed `.env.example`
- reviewed Chatwoot storage docs:
https://developers.chatwoot.com/self-hosted/deployment/storage/s3-bucket
- reviewed Active Storage URL expectations in
`spec/controllers/slack_uploads_controller_spec.rb` and
`spec/services/line/send_on_line_service_spec.rb`
- ran `bundle exec bundle-audit check --no-update`
Devise 4.9.x has a race condition in the reconfirmable flow where
concurrent email change requests can desynchronize the confirmation
token from `unconfirmed_email`, letting an attacker confirm an email
they don't own. We use `:confirmable` with `reconfirmable = true`, so
we're directly exposed.
The upstream fix is in Devise 5.0.3, but we can't upgrade —
`devise-two-factor` only supports Devise 5 from v6.4.0, which also
raised its Rails minimum to 7.2+. No released version supports both
Devise 5 and Rails 7.1.
This PR ports the Devise 5.0.3 fix locally by overriding
`postpone_email_change_until_confirmation_and_regenerate_confirmation_token`
on the User model to persist the record before regenerating the token.
This is a stopgap — remove it once the dependency chain allows upgrading
to Devise 5.
### How to test
Sign in as a confirmed user and change your email. The app should send a
confirmation to the new address while keeping the current email
unchanged until confirmed.
